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status, the road was paved with many obstacles. Scholars argue that Taiwan deploys its 
trade diplomacy in order to promote its national awareness as a sovereign entity. 
Therefore, the economic rapprochement with Russia was regarded as being politically 
motivated. This project aims to empirically test this hypothesis by the use of the gravity 
model of trade, in order to simulate the trade potential between Russia and Taiwan; and 
thus determine the rational behind Taiwan’s trade strategy in relation to Russia. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Research Problem 
A conventional Taiwanese claim argues that, Republic of China (ROC) has 
survived as a sovereign and independent state for over fifty years. The sole 
controversy considering Taiwan’s independent existence should be its labeling, 
whether to call it “The Republic of China” “the Republic of Taiwan” or simply 
“Taiwan”. In a work published by Yang (1997), regarding Taiwan’s expanding role in 
the international arena in Democratic Progressive Party’s perspective, a party that 
highly favor’s Taiwan’s sovereignty, a clear statement has been made declaring that 
the island is a sovereign nation, independent of the mainland, and “ Taiwan’s present 
and future destiny is not an internal affair of China” (Yang, 1997, p.3). When it comes 
to classifying Taiwan as a state, the world is still holding to the cold war accord of 
having the pending reunification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and 
disregarding the claim of 23 million Taiwanese citizens. (Fan, 2007).  
 Starting from the 1970’s, Taiwan’s main objective was to expel the China 
enforced international isolation; thus, Taiwanese economic strategies were serving its 
foreign policies by approaching partners that can potentially convert economic 
compliances into diplomatic relations. From a Taiwanese perspective, large polls of 
economic allies are able to support the country’s long lost sovereignty. Thus, 
regardless of the economic outcomes, Taiwan designs its trade policies relying on the 
by-product that comes along with the economic engagements. This includes 
institutionalizing economic alliances and establishing diplomatic pacts with countries 
that support PRC on the international political scene. Many scholars pointed out to the 
success of this particular trade strategy, as it enabled them to reduce the international 
isolation and peacefully compete with Mainland China. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 14). 
By 1980’s, the government had the possibility of directing its economic orders 
free from private interest groups. Although, the situation had slightly altered in the 
early 1990’s, the authorities possessed the ability to direct the production and the 
distribution channels for key commodities. Through this, the policy makers 
independently implemented their strategies in the best way that would serve the 
country’s national interest. By then, in a more politically open countries, such as the 
United States, the lobbying influence of the private interest groups was much higher, 
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since privately owned firms handled a larger proportion of the economy. Taiwanese 
economy lacked this aspect, as state owned enterprises (SEO), were the main 
influence in directing trade channels and resources. (Baldwin, Chen, & Nelson, 1995). 
By the end of 1980’s, Taiwan’s trade was hardly considered as multilateral, 
since it was extensively dependent on the United States and Japan. With the 
strengthening of Taiwanese currency, their products were no longer within the 
competitive price range. This urged the authorities to seek out for a broader markets; 
hence, in 1987 SEO’s with other business entities conveyed a trade mission to 
Western Europe mainly in Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
(Underwood, 1992). Later, the fall of communism was perceived as an opportunity to 
establish economic ties with the former Eastern Bloc; moreover, it was the fall of 
Soviet-Union in 1991 that induced the best opportunity for Taiwan to launch its 
political assault in the region by building economic diplomacy with the Russian 
Federation. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 95). 
Ever since, Taiwan consistently attempted to improve its bilateral trade 
relations with the Ex-Soviet country. The first trade mission was sent in May 28 1991, 
(Bazhanov, 1996); the same year in September, Taiwan signed its largest trade deal 
with the Soviet Union that portrayed the trade of Taiwanese consumers’ good in 
exchange of Russian raw material. (Hu, 2007). Later in 1991, Taipei World Trade 
Centre Co., Ltd, (CETRA) established its first branch in Moscow. Two years later, in 
1993, in an attempt to further impose Taiwanese presence in Russia, Representative 
Office in Moscow for the Taipei-Moscow Economic cultural Coordination 
Commission was founded. The staff of the association included some diplomats that 
had the right to issue visas through the offices in Riga. In 1996, Representative Office 
in Taipei for the Taipei-Moscow Economic cultural Coordination Commission was 
founded, and it had the right to issue Russian visas for Taiwanese citizens. The main 
aim of these offices was to facilitate and advocate trade between the two countries, by 
assisting Taiwanese and Russian business executives with market information. 
(Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 96).  The series of attempts made by Taiwan in order to gain a 
bigger share in Russian market has somewhat succeeded, according to IMF Direction 
of Trade Statistics; over the years, from 1990 until the present day, two-way trade 
between Russia and Taiwan witnessed an increasing trend.  
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1.2.  Research Question 
The current research links the discussion of the Cross Strait crisis and 
Taiwanese eagerness of having Russia as a cooperative state, through trade promoting 
strategies. Numerous Taiwanese attempts to inaugurate the Russian market was 
perceived as to be politically motivated; to test this hypothesis, a quantitative study of 
world trade patterns will be conducted that will allow us to pinpoint trade dynamics 
between the two countries, and thus identify the breakeven point between their trade 
potential and actual trade values; hence, diagnose Taiwanese motives following their 
quest for establishing Russia as an imminent trade partner. Therefore, the outcome of 
the analysis will determine whether Taiwan’s trade with Russia is a pretext to rip its 
political benefits, or it is economically motivated to reach out to a greater segment of 
the Russian economy for a profitable trade partnership. 
 
What is the main drive of Taiwanese trade policy in relation to Russia? 
 
The current research will aim to measure trade potentials between Russia and Taiwan, 
by applying the gravity model of trade on a cross section analysis for four separate 
years; 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. 
 
The first section of this paper provides an overview regarding political and 
economic circumstances of the trade partnership between Russia and Taiwan with a 
focus on Taiwan’s sovereignty, Russia’s stance in regard to the Cross Strait crisis, 
China’s role as regional ally to Russia, and the key complementarity of Russian and 
Taiwanese economies. In the second section, the gravity model of trade will be 
introduced with an outline of its theoretical foundation, an overview of previous 
research conducted with the model in our field of interest; furthermore, an explanation 
will be given regarding the data and the version of gravity model that will be used 
throughout the analysis. In the third section, results of each separate year will be 
analyzed and discussed. In the fourth section, an explanation will be given regarding 
Taiwanese trade policies based on the findings. Finally, the last section will provide a 
conclusion for the topic.  
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2. Background information 
2.1. Russia’s Role in the Cross Strait Crisis 
2.1.1. UN, Taiwan and its Domestic Sovereignty 
In mid 1940’s, when the allied forces defeated Japan, Taiwan was under the 
rule of ROC with the governance of Kuomintang (KMT) party. While having control 
over the Mainland China, in 1945, with the support of the United States, Taiwan had 
its seat in United Nations’ council. However, in the late 1940’s, the confrontations 
with mainland China intensified, and the KMT party was crushed by the Communist 
Party of China (CPC); thus, KMT was forced to move its power to Taiwan by 1949.  
Accordingly, the never-ending conflict of Cross Strait was established, and things 
remained unresolved for Taiwan. (Huang, 2008).  
In 1951, to end the hostility with Japan, the allied powers opted to sign the 
peace treaty of San Francisco in September 1951, where Taiwan’s status as colony to 
Japan officially ended. However, no indications were made regarding the authority 
that has the right to govern Taiwan. Consequently, in April 1952, with the pressure of 
the United States, Japan was forced to sign another treaty with the KMT. Nonetheless, 
Taiwan’s status left unsettled, and to be determined in accordance to the principle of 
the United Nations Charter. Given the circumstances, especially with the outbreak of 
the Korean War, in 1953, Taiwan’s strategic location became ever more appealing to 
the United States; thus, ROC ruled by KMT was considered as Anti-Communist ally 
in the East Asia. (Yang, 1997, p. 5). By the beginning of 1950 until mid 1960, United 
States consistently provided economic and military aid to Taiwan. Dialogues and 
negotiations were underway for long-term settlements regarding economic affairs; 
however, in late 1960’s, with the eruption of the Sino-Soviet War, the United States 
shifted its policies in Asia within its strategy to overcome the Soviet-Union; and thus 
PRC was perceived as an Anti-Soviet accomplice. By 1971, with the support of the 
United States, the settlement of the UN was not in favor of ROC, as the Resolution 
2758 passed and imposed PCR as the sole legitimate representative of China. 
Consequently, the situation flipped, Taiwan’s seat was dismissed and replaced by 
China. (Huang, 2008). 
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Figure	  1:	  Diplomatic	  Allies	  of	  PRC	  and	  ROC	  
	  Source:	  Tubilewicz	  (2007)	  Page:	  7-­‐9 
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existence. Usually, international legal sovereignty is regarded as a stationary concept, 
a country either has it or not.  However, the case of Taiwan proved that sovereignty 
could exist in different levels; the fact that Taiwan enjoys a domestic and functional 
sovereignty, it is capable of operating on the international level in terms of bilateral 
trade negotiations, applications to World Organizations (WTO, WHO) and 
engagements in other types of political and diplomatic talks with various international 
entities. This sovereignty is mainly present for the fact that a single authority, in this 
case the Taiwanese government, has full control over the country. UN membership, 
however, requires an international legal sovereignty, that is the recognition of 
Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty by external entities. (Sigrid, 2008). However, as 
Krasner (2001) defined, domestic sovereignty is found in the “authority structures 
within states and the ability of these structures to effectively regulate behavior”. By 
that, Taiwan, regardless of its international sovereign status, can be considered as 
domestically sovereign state, imposing a full pledge authority on its economic and 
political activities.  
PRC's	  Diplomatic	  Allies,	  136	  
ROC's	  DImplomatic	  Allies,	  22	  
0	  20	  
40	  60	  
80	  100	  
120	  140	  
160	  
N
um
be
r	  
of
	  A
lli
es
	  
Awedis	  Achjian	  
9	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
 
2.1.2. The Dynamics of Russia-Taiwan relations 
Pleasant policies of Russia in regard to Taiwan are highly desired by Taipei, 
given the significant role of Russia in the cross strait conflict. Politically, with the 
regional circumstances, achieving Russia’s friendliness had proved to be challenging, 
especially with the external pressure imposed from the United States and China. 
Among all the Eastern European countries; Russia, owns massive amounts of natural 
resources, it is a military powerhouse and permanent a member of the United Nations; 
thus it earns a high influence in the international political scene. The establishment of 
official relations between the countries would have been a turning point in the cross 
strait relations, as it would help Taiwan to escape PRC-imposed international 
isolation. Consequently, Taipei targeted to establish a of sort relation that it enjoys 
with the United States; a pseudo-diplomatic links with high levels of economic 
cooperation. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 95). Comprehensibly, China would be eager to 
obstruct any development of relations between its “arm supplying neighbor” and 
Taiwan. 
Following the defeat of Taiwan in the Chinese Civil war, ROC was reallocated 
in Taiwan, where KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek established the aircraft carrier of the 
anti-Soviet bloc in East Asia. By that time, Russia offered its economic, diplomatic 
and military support to China, and withdrew any type of contact with Taiwan. The 
tensions between the Soviet-Union and Taiwan reached its peak in 1954 when the 
navy forces of ROC seized a Russian Tanker and captured its entire crew. 
Surprisingly, Sino-Soviet clashes of late 1960 did not influence Moscow-Taipei 
relations; in contrast, still Chiang regarded the Soviets as hostile and traitorous entity. 
However, it was United States shift to China-friendly policy, and the 1971 UN 
resolution that enabled Taiwan to use its “Soviet-card” by signaling consistent threats 
of potential economic and secret military ties with Russia. Nevertheless, despite all 
the symbolic acts of approachability, no significant contact was made between 
Taiwan and Russia in the cold war era; rather it was until the late 1980’s when the 
hostility finally came to an end. (Tubilewicz, 2007, pp. 26-27). To sum up, from 1950 
till 1985, covering almost the whole period of cold war, Moscow and Taipei were in 
deep enmity. It first started with the Beijing-Moscow alliance, and aggravated with 
the outburst of the Korean war from 1950 till 1953; thus communist soviets and KMT 
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were repeatedly clashing in the diplomatic scene, while Moscow consistently asking 
for the restoration of PCR’s right to be the representative of China on the international 
level. (Bazhanov, 1996).  
In the late 1980’s, Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing ended the tension between the 
two Communist giants; however, a contact with Taiwan was yet to be made. In 1988, 
the ease of global economic tension along with the Russian rational of “Prestroika” 
and “New Thinking” resulted into the first economic and cultural interactions with 
Taiwan. (Hu, 2007). By 1991, with the military coup, it was the right time for the 
Taiwanese authority to approach the Russian Federation. First, expectation were high, 
that a quasi-diplomatic ties, the sort of relations Taiwan has with the United States, 
could be established. In January 1992, the Taiwanese Vice Foreign Minister paid a 
visit to Russia, where he announced the donation of $20 millions worth of rice to the 
Russian Federation. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 96). This is when the fist Chinese objection 
appeared, as they expressed their tendency for the international entities to reduce their 
interaction with KMT authorities. By this time, offices in Moscow and Taipei have 
already started operating, and Chinese authorities perceived it as a significant upgrade 
and institutionalization of relations between Russia and Taiwan. Hence, this created a 
strong objection from Beijing, and the Chinese government asked for justifications 
regarding the issue. In late 1992, Yeltsin published a decree, where he reassured to 
China the Russian stand: 
 
“In relations with Taiwan the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that 
there is only one China. The government of the People's Republic of China is 
the sole legal government, representing the whole of China. Taiwan is an 
inalienable part of China. 
The Russian Federation does not maintain official inter- state relations with 
Taiwan. Economic, scientific, cultural and other unofficial ties between Russia 
and Taiwan are executed by individual citizens and non-governmental 
organizations, empowered with functions necessary for legal, technical and 
other provision of these ties, and the protection of Russian citizens' rights in 
Taiwan. These ties are regulated by appropriate legal acts of the Russian 
Federation.” ( Bazhanov, 1996) 
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Later in mid 1990’s, Russian internal situation changed, and eventually it affected its 
foreign policy, as a greater attention was devoted to the Asia Pacific region.  Thus, 
PRC became the core of Kremlin’s policy towards the region. As Sino-Russian ties 
improved, China, became the most crucial partner for Russia in the region. 
Consequently, pro-Taiwanese influence in Russia decreased substantially, as Russian 
authorities once more declared their support for “One China” hypothesis. (Bazhanov, 
1996).  
During the cross-strait crisis in March 1996, Russia encouraged a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis; however, president Yeltsin did not condemn China for its 
actions. (Hu, 2007). By that time, Taiwan tried to adopt a new strategy to integrate 
into Russia’s diplomacy; therefore, politicians in Taipei tried to create a Taiwanese 
lobby in Moscow by influencing certain group of people in Russia. As a result, major 
political parties became their target groups, but the duty of instituting friendliness 
proved to be difficult, as the majority of the parties in Russia enjoyed a stable 
relationship with CPC. Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) headed by 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who was a failed candidate in Russian elections of 1996, was 
the sole party publically supporting Taiwan. (Tubilewicz, 2002). Generally, in late 
1990’s, relations remained stagnant, due to the unwillingness of the Russian 
government to engage in official talks with the Taiwanese authorities. In 2000, when 
Vladimir Putin, inaugurated his presidency, Russia adopted a less lenient policy 
towards Taiwan. Putin was in full support of “one China” policy, even he pledged a 
military support to China in case of an American interventions to in any Sino-
Taiwanese conflict. In addition, under Putin, Moscow increased its arms supplies to 
China, and equipped it with right weaponry for a naval invasion to Taiwan. However, 
Putin didn’t felt the urge in obstructing any sort of scientific or technological 
development; in fact, in July 2002, Taipei established “Taiwan-Russia Association”, 
that aimed to boost economic, cultural, scientific and academic exchange between the 
two countries. (Tubilewicz, 2007, pp. 115-119).   
As of now, Taiwan already had its accession to WTO as an autonomous 
member, independent from China. It was believed that Taiwan’s accession to WTO 
would provide a legal framework to promote its economic relations. Nevertheless, it 
didn’t affect much Taiwan’s sovereignty, nor upgraded its ties with international key 
players. (Sigrid, 2008). As far as Russian relations are concerned, negotiations took 
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place between Russia and Taiwan over Russia’s forthcoming accession to the WTO. 
Thereupon, economic relations were further improved as Taiwan increased its access 
to the Russian market. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 120). 
 
2.1.3. Chinese and Russian Interdependence  
While Taiwan was trying to get the sympathy of Russia during the post-Cold 
War era, Chinese anxiety was evident. Nevertheless, the Russian response to the 
Chinese complaints has always been comforting to Beijing, as repetitive 
reinforcements were declared regarding Russian stance vis-à-vis the cross-strait 
conflict. Hence, both sides do not desire losing post Soviet established relations that is 
mainly derived from their geopolitical and economic interdependence. It was over 
forty years ago when the countries clashed for the last time; thus, peacekeeping over 
the 4000 Kilometer boarder itself, is an utmost mutual accord for both sides. Since the 
demarcation of the Sino-Soviet boarder in 1991, the core element of their relation has 
been military cooperation. Accordingly, this collaboration had been translated into 
strategic partnership. First, series of political-military meetings occurred with high-
ranked personals such as military chiefs and defense ministers; second, various types 
of military trainings took place with joint education programs and exercises for both 
armies; third, extensive technical cooperation was underway with the transfer of 
technological know-how for military equipment production. Since the break up of 
Soviet Union from 1991 till 2010, 90 percent of China’s arm supply came from 
Russia. (Holtom, et Al. 2011).   
 
Figure	  2:	  Russian	  Arm	  Sales	  to	  China	  
	  Trade	  Indicator	  Value	  in	  millions	  of	  Dollars,	  source:	  Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute	  
0	  500	  
1000	  1500	  
2000	  2500	  
3000	  3500	  
1992	   1994	   1995	   1998	   2000	   2002	   2004	   2006	   2008	   2010	   2012	  
Arm	  Sales	  To	  China	  
2	  per.	  Mov.	  Avg.	  (Arm	  Sales	  To	  China)	  
Awedis	  Achjian	  
13	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
	  
In late 1990’s, after the “Strategic Partnership of Coordination”, Russian and 
Chinese policies converged in regards to United States’ dominance of the 
international system. Hence, Moscow relied on Beijing to counterbalance the 
disequilibrium, as both parties believed that their cooperation would better serve 
promoting their national interests. However, analyzing the case separately, China is of 
mere importance to Russia. In the early 1990’s, by the time when Taiwan was trying 
to improve its relations with Russia, the defense ministry in Moscow was on a brink 
of bankruptcy. Therefore, Russian arm sales to China had enabled the ministry to 
rebalance its accounts. Moreover, as China became a net importer of oil in 1993, 
Russia consistently tried to establish China as its main oil export partner; this was 
mostly to decrease its dependence from European costumers, who on their turn are 
trying to reach out to a broader market beyond Russia. (Trenin, 2012). Moreover, 
from 1992 till 2005, Russia had failed to significantly integrate into the Asia Pacific. 
Pursuing to ascertain its military and political presence in the region, Moscow counts 
on China as the gateway to Asia Pacific. Therefore, while Russia is trying to diversify 
its relation beyond China, it is manipulating the Sino-Russian cooperation to achieve 
this task. (Christoffersen, 2010). Consequently, Moscow was carefully tailoring its 
relations with Taipei, as the strategy was to maintain decent relations with China and 
still economically benefit from Taiwan. 
On the other hand, from China’s perspective, beside all the mutual political 
interests, Russia has a great deal of importance especially when it comes to the 
settlement of the cross strait crisis. If it happens that China would opt to a military 
resolution for the Taiwanese crisis, an international economic sanction will be 
imposed on China; therefore, sound relation with Russia would help China survive the 
sanctions. Moreover, after the tragedy of Tiananmen in 1989, all the major powers 
banned arms sale to China; therefore, in a military conflict with Taiwan, China would 
crucially need the Russian arm supplies. Lastly, China to secure its large oil demand, 
it resorts to the troubled Middle East. A crisis along that region, or in Hormuz, would 
disrupt the flow of energy to China; thus, to compensate the shortage of supply, China 
would resort to Russian oil. (Hu, 2007). Considering all these factors, neither Russia 
would like to downgrade its relations with China, nor China would like to lose its 
“friendship” with Russia. Thus, any move from Taiwan in regard to its relations with 
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Russia, would be closely monitored by China. However, regardless of its political 
grandness, Russia had a century long of economic fluctuations; accompanied by 
fundamental changes in its economic structure that resulted into long lasting 
economic hardships; whereas Taiwan’s experience was mainly highlighted by 
stability and long-term economic development. Thus, by the time when Taiwan 
approached Russia to end the Cold War hostility, its economic superiority was luring 
Russia to get engage in diplomatic talks and risking its relations with China. 
Separately looking into the economic transitions of both countries will allow us to 
determine the importance of the “economic-card” played by Taiwan. 
 
2.2. Russian and Taiwanese Economic complementarity. 
2.2.1. Taiwan The Little “Dragon” of Asia 
During 1910’s and 1920’s, Taiwanese agricultural sector underwent a series of 
reforms, which can be incorporated as an agricultural revolution. Hence, a widespread 
development in the production of commodities took place, mainly in harvest of rice 
and sugar. A capitalist way of production, inspired from the Japanese sugar industry 
helped increase productivity tremendously. In parallel, during 1920’s, an escalation of 
rice production took place, mainly with the support of new cultivating techniques. 
However, production declined tremendously by the outburst of the war, until it 
bounced back in 1952, and it succeeded to fulfill the increasing demand of the 
growing population, more importantly, it thrived to supply raw materials needed to 
the industrial sector. (Liu, 1969). By that time, when the treaty was already signed 
with Japan, Taiwanese authority regarded itself as an entity in exile; therefore policies 
were implemented in the basis of survival imperative. After a decade long of 
hyperinflation, the country suffered an economic backlash. Prices witnessed an annual 
increase of 500 percent between 1946 and 1948. Besides, favoritism was a malignant 
component of the Taiwanese economy. Accordingly, stability and equitable growth 
headed KMT’s agenda for economic reforms. Hence, throughout the 55 years of KMT 
rule in Taiwan, a faithful adherence to equality existed, since the implemented 
economic policies fulfilled the concept of “Seeking growth with stability”. Note that 
the tendency of having an uneven economy in terms of wealth distribution, will 
eventually distract the political stability, as it will be strategically exploited by the 
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Chinese government to twist the low income stratum in Taiwan against the nationalist 
government of KMT. (Ash & Greene, 2007, p. 55).  
The conventional belief regarding the Taiwanese growth model claims that; 
the economic expansion program started with import substitution strategy, followed 
by export promotion. In the late 1960’s, as the United States ceased to provide aid to 
Taiwan, a broader economic policies were implemented to boost exports. Sound 
macroeconomic environment, higher interest rates, trade liberalization combined with 
public investments in infrastructure and human capital generated the appropriate 
setting that enhanced exports, which became the basis of the Taiwanese growth 
model. The derived wealth from this model resulted into rising incomes, investments 
and savings. In addition, beside this mainstream belief, Rodrik (1994), points out to 
the role of the government that succeeded in implementing the exact interventions to 
remove coordination failures and promote higher returns on investment.  As a result, 
after the second world war, Taiwan scored 8.8 percent average rate of growth between 
1951 and 1987.(Chevalieras, 2010). Currently, Taiwan exports nearly four times the 
values of goods and services exported by United States measured per capita terms. 
(Ball, Chen & Well-Strand, 2011). In 2012, Taiwan had GDP per capita of  $20,386. 
(National Bureau of Statistic Republics of China, 2013) among the highest in the 
world; with 58.8 percent of its labor force being engaged in the service sector, and a 
current account surplus of $40.88 billion. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). 
 
Figure	  3:	  Per	  Capita	  GDP	  Trend	  in	  East	  Asia	  
	  GDP	   per	   Capita	   in	   US$	   Source:	   UN	   National	   Accounts	   Main	   Aggregates	   Database,	   except	   for	   Taiwan:	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistic	  Republics	  of	  China	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2.2.2. Russian Post-Soviet Plunge  
On the other hand, Russian economic journey was similar to Taiwan’s in one 
sense that industrialization took place in the 20th century. Otherwise, unlike Taiwan, 
Russia’s road was paved with many bumps, as it was victim to deep economic cycles. 
In late 1920’s, Stalin imposed a forced industrialization, which enabled Russia to 
make the breakthrough from a poor agricultural economy to an industrial one. This 
success is mainly explained by Stalin’s decision to discriminatorily invest in heavy 
industry that stimulated full employment in an economy of heavy rural labor surplus. 
Thus, living standards grew substantially, particularly among the urban workers, in 
the period of 1928 until 1937. (Gregory, 2004). Labor productivity growth was 
relatively slow (3 percent annually) in 1930; however, in 1950’s it accelerated 
reaching almost 6 percent. Thus the Soviet Union experienced its “Golden Age” in the 
decade of 1950’s. Consequently, for that decade, the growth accounting of Russia 
yielded similar numbers as the ones of Taiwan registered in year 1960-80’s. However, 
this growth didn’t prove to be long lasting, rather it ended by 1960. By 1970, TPF was 
almost 2 percent, until it declined to 1 percent in 1980’s, and by the time of the 
transition in 1990, TPF was negative. Conformist argument regarding the Russian 
economic plunge mainly accuses over-investment. Thus, large inputs of labor and 
capital at first yielded significant rates of growth; however, by the time when TPF 
started contracting it imposed a heavy burden on the economy. (Popov, 2010).  
Post-soviet Yeltsin period, was also a tough phase for the Russian economy. 
The transition from Soviet Central Planned Economy (CPE) to a Market Economy 
made Russia lose almost 30 percent of its economy. By 1992, the inflation escalated 
until it reached 2000 percent, as a result, in 1998 the government was forced to 
sharply devaluate the currency. This made the depositors lose their savings; hence, the 
average disposable income of a Russian citizen fell by 25 percent in real terms from 
1993 to 1999. Later in the second millennium, Russian exports grew by 525 percent, 
mainly by the trade of oil and petroleum related products. Until the world financial 
crisis, Russian economy witnessed a stable and flourishing development. Living 
standards improved as GDP increased by 6.9 percent on average over the years of 
1999 till 2008. (Cooper, 2009). 
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Figure	  4:	  Inflation	  and	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  in	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Russia	  
	  Left	  axis	  represents	  inflation	  rate.	  Right	  axis	  represents	  GDP	  growth	  rate.	  Source:	  World	  Bank. 
 
 
2.2.3. Win-Win Outcome of The Trade Partnership  
In early 1990, as Taiwan’s GNI per capita exceeded Russia’s by three folds, 
Taiwan’s attractiveness to Russia was growing for various reasons. (Tubilewicz, 
2007, p. 98). First, Taiwan, by all means was on its way to become among the richest 
countries in the world. Thus, Russian expectations from the Taiwanese rapprochement 
was to rip the benefits of “wealthy” Taiwan, by potentially demanding more aid and 
cheap loans in times of hardships during the economic transition, and establish 
Taiwan as a major destination for Russia’s raw material export. Moreover, Russia 
potentially was about to copy the Taiwanese model of development, since many 
scholars in Russia considered it the ideal prototype for post-transition development. 
(Bazhanov, 1996). By the time when Taiwan launched its onset for an economic 
partnership with Russia, Taipei had planned for massive infrastructural project; thus, 
the country demanded enormous amounts of raw materials. Hence, the reciprocal 
trade would have yielded a “win-win” outcome for both sides, as Russia could 
possibly supply Taiwan with natural resources, while importing consumer and capital 
goods along with the technological know-how of the Taiwanese ICT sector. 
(Underwood, 1992). In particular, Russia’s main purpose with Taiwan was to boost its 
technical cooperation with the technological industry, and to supply them with raw 
material without stirring the “One China” controversy. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 95). In a 
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nutshell, Russia was ready to embrace economic relations to establish a smoother 
transition from the Soviet era; therefore, both side were keen on developing economic 
relations. 
Trade, rather than economic aid or FDI mainly highlighted the interaction 
between both economies. Consequently, having a framework, which will allow us to 
analyze bilateral trade between them will determine the extent to which both 
economies got integrated. In the following section, a presentation will be made 
regarding the analytical platform, which is grounded by the gravity model that will 
allow us simulate international world trades. And thus, analyze the development of 
the Russian Taiwanese trade from the post-Soviet era until the current days. 
 
Table	   1:	   Taiwanese	   Trade	   with	   Soviet	   Union	   (1989-­‐1991)	   and	   Russian	  
Federation	  (1992-­‐2005)	  in	  Millions	  of	  Dollars	  
year	   Export	   Import	   Total	  Trade	  (TT)	   Trade	  Balance	   Change	  in	  TT	  (%)	  	  
1989	   20.63975	   54.78735	   75.4271	   -­‐34.1476	   -­‐	  
1990	   59.02827	   60.58549	   119.61376	   -­‐1.55722	   58.58%	  
1991	   63.27174	   164.5067	   227.77844	   -­‐101.23496	   90.43%	  
1992	   23.01373	   344.978	   367.99173	   -­‐321.96427	   61.56%	  
1993	   72.88981	   641.0924	   713.98221	   -­‐568.20259	   94.02%	  
1994	   163.5621	   1096.722	   1260.2841	   -­‐933.1599	   76.51%	  
1995	   174.0303	   1627.959	   1801.9893	   -­‐1453.9287	   42.98%	  
1996	   141.2412	   1063.843	   1205.0842	   -­‐922.6018	   -­‐33.12%	  
1997	   172.4965	   1236.8	   1409.2965	   -­‐1064.3035	   16.95%	  
1998	   137.536	   843.9827	   981.5187	   -­‐706.4467	   -­‐30.35%	  
1999	   107.8372	   1183.24	   1291.0772	   -­‐1075.4028	   31.54%	  
2000	   186.0743	   1379.611	   1565.6853	   -­‐1193.5367	   21.27%	  
2001	   262.3748	   603.5263	   865.9011	   -­‐341.1515	   -­‐44.70%	  
2002	   252.716	   927.0467	   1179.7627	   -­‐674.3307	   36.25%	  
2003	   301.9935	   1299.287	   1601.2805	   -­‐997.2935	   35.73%	  
2004	   436.59	   2473.13	   2909.72	   -­‐2036.54	   81.71%	  
2005	   516.46	   2196.4	   2712.86	   -­‐1679.94	   -­‐6.77%	  
2006*	   604.067	   1902.965	   2507.032	   -­‐1298.898	   -­‐7.59%	  
2007*	   807.313	   1904.327	   2711.64	   -­‐1097.014	   8.16%	  
2008*	   929.701	   2686.816	   3616.517	   -­‐1757.115	   33.37%	  
2009*	   582.132	   2191.953	   2774.085	   -­‐1609.821	   -­‐23.29%	  
2010*	   1081.489	   2335.814	   3417.303	   -­‐1254.325	   23.19%	  
2011*	   1519.618	   2357.201	   3876.819	   -­‐837.583	   13.45%	  
2012*	   1541.067	   3133.892	   4674.959	   -­‐1592.825	   20.59%	  Source:	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  Direction	  of	  Trade	  Statistics.	  *	  Source:	  Taiwan	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	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3. The Model and The Methodology 
The specific research question addressed necessitates producing an analysis 
that captures trade pattern for given specifications. As mentioned earlier, our aim is to 
identify the motive behind Taiwan’s attempt to expand its trade market with Russia. 
The gravity model is chosen since it is one of the most empirically successful models 
in  trade economics (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003), and it allows us to define 
the normal bilateral trade patterns under standard conditions free from trade 
impediments. (Tinbergen, 1962, p. 262). 
 
3.1. The Gravity Model  
3.1.1. The Development of the Model 
Inspired by the gravity law of mechanics presented by Newton, Tinbergen 
(1962) and Pöyhönen (1963), implemented the first empirical studies on the 
international trade flows, based on purely intuitive justifications. The analogy of the 
model states that, trade flow from a given country to the other is proportionate to the 
product of their economic mass, GDP or GNP, divided by the distance separating 
their economic centers in other words, the centers of gravity.  
 𝑋!" =   𝛼     !"#!  ∗!"#!!"#$%&'(!"    (1) 
 
To generate the linear form of the model, both sides of the model should be logged: 
 𝐿𝑛  𝑋𝑖𝑗 =     𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐺𝐷𝑃! +   𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐺𝐷𝑃! +   𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" +   𝜀!"   (2)  
 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑗  denotes the export flow from country i to j; 𝐺𝐷𝑃!    and 𝐺𝐷𝑃! 
represents the Gross Domestic Product of home and destination countries 
respectively; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!"  represents the geographical distance separating both 
countries, and 𝜀!" is the distributed error term, which regards the remaining countless 
factors that influence trade. The coefficients 𝛽! , 𝛽!  and 𝛽!  indicate the indirect 
proportionality between the dependent and the independent variables. Initially, in 
Tinbergen (1962) the model was introduced in a static form, as no analysis would be 
made regarding the dynamics of export over prolonged period of time. Moreover, the 
model didn’t embrace any sort of supply and demand analysis in term of price 
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movement specificity. It had a simple design to statistically determine the primary 
factors influencing the volume of trade between two different countries. Later, 
Linneman (1966 cited in .Deardorff, 1998), in a study conducted on trade flows in 
Netherlands, added more variables to the model, and went beyond its intuitive 
principles by providing Walsarian general equilibrium system as a theoretical 
foundation for the model. The equation has been long acknowledged for its 
consistency to empirically explicate various types of flows such as migration 
commodity, and shipping. The initial works cited above had consistently produced 
stable coefficient estimates, and remarkable explanatory power. However, the lack of 
sound theoretical foundation of the model had restricted its use for predictive 
purposes. (Bergstrand, 1985).  
Nevertheless, with the efforts of many scholars, the model is no longer 
regarded as being theoretically flimsy (Deardorff, 1998). Anderson (1979 cited in 
Rahman, 2003), with microeconomic theory derived the gravity model; while using 
trade share expenditure system. His work hypothesizes “constant elasticity of 
substitution” (CES) preference function for all the countries, and separable models for 
traded and non-traded goods. Later, Bergstrand (1985) with imperfect substitute 
theory calculated the gravity model, and noted that it can be perceived as partial 
equilibrium model that has its parameter unidentified because of omitting the price 
factor; since exchange rates and price variations could significantly affect trade flows. 
Further, (Deardorff, 1995 cited in Batra, 2004), derived the model from Hecksher-
Ohlin (H-O) theory, by proving that the gravity model can be possibly calculated with 
the two extreme cases presented in H-O framework. First, it can be proven by 
frictionless trade; second, by H-O complete specialization, when two distinct 
countries produce dissimilar products. Moreover, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003, 
cited in Sepherd 2012) had introduced macroeconomic accounting identities to the 
model, and derived the “gravity with gravitas” equation that includes two additional 
independent variables. First, the outward multilateral resistance, which encompasses 
the dependence of a given country’s export to a certain destination on the cost of 
exports to other possible markets. Second, the inward multilateral resistance variable, 
which similarly implies that imports are influenced by the trade cost of all the other 
possible supply markets.  
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3.1.2. Theory supporting the model 
In this section, a theoretical backing will be given regarding the motion of the 
main variables that are able to capture some stylized facts of international trade, 
which are economic size and GDP, and thus their consistency in terms of statistical 
significance. As earlier mentioned, the model represents a high degree of statistical 
reliability; hence, reviewing the literature of gravity model, coefficients of the 
economic mass and distance are highly significant with opposite signs. When 
Tinbergen (1962), first introduced the gravity model, his explanation regarding the 
signs of the coefficients was not deeply elaborated. His assumption for the positive 
sign of economic mass was that, a country with a high level of GDP (or GNP), will 
possess higher production possibilities; therefore, its exports will be positively 
correlated with its own economic size. Similarly, a country with a high economic 
mass will have greater demand; thus, its imports would be positively affected by the 
size of its market, ie. GDP or GNP. Moreover, Krugman (1980) claims that a 
country’s exports are mostly from an industry where its goods enjoy a relatively high 
domestic demand. Therefore, two countries having identical composition of demand, 
the country that possesses a larger mass will be an exporter of good whose production 
patterns includes economies of scale. Frankel & Wei (1993) denoted the effect of per 
capita GNP, their rational was that countries with higher levels of GNP per capita 
tend to be more developed, thus would have the possibilities of broader specialization; 
hence it will enable them to increase their trade flows. 
As for the coefficient of the geographical distance, in Tinbergen (1962), it was 
assumed that the export of a country to a certain destination will be negatively related 
to the transport cost; hence, the variable is utilized as a proxy for trade costs. Besides, 
Batra (2004) claims that the time of shipment is reflected by the distance separating 
the two countries; hence, the probability of survival for given types of products is 
inversely related to the shipment time. Furthermore, when trade is occurring between 
two remote countries synchronization of delivery timing between the business entities 
is relatively more challenging. When manufacturers demand several inputs to produce 
their commodities, timing of their supply should be synchronized, otherwise the 
production will have longer time cycle. Likewise, establishing trustworthy partners in 
a distant country is more intriguing, as the cost and the outlays for searching a reliable 
associates is high. Therefore, transaction cost will become higher, and this will lead 
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into finding partners from nearby countries. Finally, in a far-off country cultural 
differences are more likely to be exposed; thus, this will have a significant role in 
trading, as consumers taste will alter substantially and negotiation clashes will 
increase. According to Chaney (2011), within the empirical work of gravity model, 
the coefficient of the distance variable is consistently negative throughout different 
sets of times and across various countries. 
 
3.1.3. Overview of Previous Research 
Initially, the gravity model haven’t been frequently utilized on applied works 
regarding trade policies and trade unions, since the earlier mentioned skeptics with 
respect to its theoretical foundations. Later, with the efforts of many scholars the 
model was accommodated to the neo-classical framework; hence, its popularity 
increased by the mid 1990’s. (Kolesnikov & Podkorytova 2011).  McCallum (1995), 
used the gravity model to determine the influence of borders on Canada’s trade with 
United States. While controlling for usual determinants of trade, he found out that the 
scale of trade within the Canadian provinces is larger than the across border trade with 
United States by twenty-two folds. Frankel et al. (1997) have implemented the gravity 
model to examine the interaction of multilateral trading systems with regional blocs, 
by the use of cross section analysis on 63 different countries starting from 1965. The 
analysis served for concluding policy recommendations that will facilitate and 
harmonize regional trade.  Rose and Reuven (2000) has investigated the effect of 
currency unions; in his work he implemented a panel data analysis to conclude that 
trade within a pair of countries is more likely to increase if the transactions are made 
with a shared currency. Later Rose (2004) estimated the effect of WTO on 
international trade, with the use of augmented gravity model that embraced numerous 
extraneous variables. Thus, he compared trade patterns of GATT/WTO members with 
those outside the organization. His results concluded that WTO has failed to promote 
trade. Subramanian and Wei (2007), with their doubt of Rose (2004) results 
revaluated the effect of WTO membership using the model suggested by Anderson 
and Van Wincoop (2003). In contrast to Rose (2004) their results revealed that 
GATT/WTO membership has generated an additional 120 percent of international 
world trade.    
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In relevance to our topic, decent amount of works implemented the gravity 
model on Russia and Taiwan. Given the latter’s specialization in ICT, Huang and 
Yang (2009) applied a gravity model on Taiwan’s export of ICT to 51 different 
countries from 1997 to 2003. He added a dependent variable that mirrors the degree 
of intellectual property rights in the destination country. Accordingly, he tested for 
three different models with different dependent variables; first, the value of total 
exports; second, exports of high tech; third, exports of “non-high-tech”. His results 
revealed the high sensitivity of Taiwan’s high-tech export to the destination country’s 
degree of intellectual property rights. From the works conducted on Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), Chow (2011) examined the effect of Taiwanese FDI on its own 
exports. The author’s data dates from 1989 till 2006 across 15 sectors within the 
manufacturing industry in 11 different countries. The study embodied a modified 
version of gravity model where he applied the FDI on a given sector as a dependent 
variable; moreover, he decomposed the values of total trade into groups of similar 
products in accordance to the FDI targeted to that particular group, and used export of 
product group as an independent variable. His results revealed that in case of Taiwan, 
the FDI has a complementary role rather than substituting effect on exports. On the 
other hand, Ledyaeva and Linden (2006) examined the FDI inflow to Russia; the main 
aim for the research was to determine the flow of foreign investment across different 
regions in Russia. For that purpose, the authors designed a cross section gravity model 
for the year 2002. To reflect on the volume of FDI they used number of foreign firms 
in different regions as an independent variable with Gross Regional Product and GDP 
of the source country as the main explanatory variables. From the results, the authors 
concluded that resource abundant regions are less likely to be a magnet for FDI, as 
they believe the energy sector is highly monopolized. 
Moreover, research regarding the analysis of trade agreements, B. Lissovolik 
and Y. Lissovolik (2006) examined the “outsider position” of Russia in WTO. The 
model used embodied Russia’s pairwise trade; thus, by solely using trades recorded 
by Russia rather than taking into account all the multilateral trades registered across 
the world, the authors analyzed a cross-section and panel data regressions longing 
from 1995 to 2002. Given the results, they deduced that Russia’s exports are 
significantly skewed away from other WTO members; thus, on the long run, Russia’s 
accession to WTO will substantially increase its exports. Chen, Lai and Lui (2012) 
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investigated the effect of Taiwan’s exclusion from Regional Trade agreements. Their 
data was focused on Taiwan’s trade with 21 different countries form 1980 to 2008. 
The conclusion reached from the analysis was that ANZCER and NAFTA are causing 
a considerable import diversion; whereas, AFTA and CEPA have a positive effect 
both on imports and exports of Taiwan. Moreover, Xu and Yu (2011) assessed the 
cross strait trade patterns to determine whether the trade barrier imposed by Taiwan 
and China are restraining the bilateral trade between the two countries to reach its full 
potential. The methodology used was to run two sets of panel data regression dating 
from 1980 to 2000. The first set included all 177 countries, and second was just 
focused on 10 East Asian economies. According to the model, Taiwan is importing 
from China half the amount predicted, and is exporting above its full potential value 
by two folds. 
 
3.2. Methodology and Data 
3.2.1. Our approach 
As mentioned earlier, our aim is to identify the motive behind Taiwan’s 
attempt to expand its trade market with Russia. Thus, gravity model will be employed 
in order to define the normal bilateral trade patterns under standard conditions free 
from trade obstructions. The following basic gravity model represents the export Xij 
from a given country to another that is proportional to their GDPi  and GDPj, and  
inversely related to the distance that separates them, with every variable having its 
own parameter:  
 𝐿𝑛  𝑋𝑖𝑗 =     𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐺𝐷𝑃! +   𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐺𝐷𝑃! +   𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" +   𝜀!" (2) 
 
 
The following equation represents the baseline model; however, it is a known fact that 
there are numerous other factors influencing trade. Therefore, our estimated model 
will be noted as: 
 𝐿𝑛  𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐺𝐷𝑃! +   𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝐺𝐷𝑃! +   𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" + 𝛽!  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦!"+ 𝛽!  𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒!" + 𝛽!  𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇!/!   \  𝑊𝑇𝑂!/! + 𝛽!  𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇!"   \  𝑊𝑇𝑂!"+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑇𝐴!" +     𝜀!" 
(3) 
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Where i represents the country of origin, in the case the exporter, and j represents the 
country of destination. Thus, the variables are defined as follows: 
 
Xij : denotes the export of country i to country j, the value presented is at nominal 
prices. 
  
GDPi and GDPj: This variable is the measure of the economic size of a given country. 
In accordance to the trade flows, GDP is not deflated. Since the model analyzes the 
data in a fix point of time, nominal GDP will yield equivalent results as real GDP. 
(Sepherd, 2012). Besides, Batra (2004) claims that trade transactions are conducted 
with international prices; therefore, including real GDP will have no influence. As 
mentioned in the theory above, countries with higher GDP are more likely to trade; 
thus, it is expected that the variable would have a positive coefficient. 
 
WDistanceij : This continuous variable denotes the weighted great circle distance 
between the economic center of countries i and j measured in Kilometers. Since major 
proportion of trade is done by air nowadays (Batra, 2004), it is justified to use the 
great circle or linear distance from the destination i to j. As argued earlier, remoteness 
is viewed as proxy for cost, given all the factors mentioned earlier, it is anticipated for 
the coefficient to have a negative sign.  
   
Contiguityij : The dummy variable is used to indicate whether countries i and j are 
contiguous or adjacent. Contiguity can have similar effects as the distance variable, 
since it takes into account the capital-to-capital trade. The variable bears the value one 
if countries i and j share a common border, and zero otherwise. The anticipated sign 
of the coefficient of this variable is positive, as many factors facilitates trade between 
neighboring countries. 
 
Languageij : This dummy variable indicates whether countries i and j share a common 
official language, if so, the variable takes the value one and zero otherwise. Since 
common language facilitates trade negotiations, it is expected to reduce transaction 
cost.(Batra, 2004). Therefore, the expected sign of the coefficient is positive. 
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To estimate the GATT/WTO effect on trade categorical variables with tree different 
outcomes will be used. The reference category will be when both countries are 
members of GATT/WTO.  𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇!"   \  𝑊𝑇𝑂!" : Will be the variable for having none of the countries as a member, 
if both countries of the pair are non-members it will bear the value one, and zero 
otherwise. 𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇!/!   \  𝑊𝑇𝑂!/! : Will be the variable for having a single country of the pair in 
GATT/WTO, if that is the case it will bear the value one and zero otherwise. 
Rose (2004), had pointed out the failure of WTO in promoting international trade; 
however, Subramanian and Wei (2007) opposed to the view by empirical evidence 
suggesting that WTO had generated a significant amount of additional world trade. 
Given the opposing views, the sign of the variable will be revealed by the equation, 
without any prior expectations. 
 
RTAij:  The dummy variable takes the value 1 if a regional trade agreement is in force 
between a given pair of countries, otherwise zero. The purpose of the regional trade 
agreements is to promote bilateral trade between the countries in force. Taking into 
account the geographical bias of the RTA’s, the sign of the coefficient is expected to 
be positive.  
In addition to equation (3), the gravity model can be estimated as proposed by 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) by calculating 
the dependent variable as total amount of trade (import plus export). Therefore, the 
model would define the overall bilateral trade flows between two countries given the 
product of their economic size and bilateral distance. By this model, it is possible to 
capture the standard amount of total trade that can potentially be conducted between 
Russia and Taiwan. The model is defined as follows : 
  𝐿𝑛  𝑇𝑖𝑗 =     𝛼 + 𝛽!  𝐿𝑛   𝐺𝐷𝑃! ∗   𝐺𝐷𝑃! +   𝛽!  𝐿𝑛  𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" + 𝛽!  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦!"+ 𝛽!  𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒!" +   𝛽!  𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇!/!   \  𝑊𝑇𝑂!/! + 𝛽!  𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇!"   \  𝑊𝑇𝑂!"+ 𝛽!  𝑅𝑇𝐴!" +     𝜀!" 
 (4) 
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The variables are defined and explained as in equation (3); with the exception of the 
dependent variable Tij that will denote the total amount of trade. 
To estimate the equations (3) and (4) OLS technique will be used, which will 
provide the best fit that describes the connection of trade with the other independent 
variables. These equations suggest that trade within countries i and j and the 
independent variables are represented with a constant elasticity; in other words a one 
percent increase in the distance separating countries i and j will result into 𝛽! percent 
decrease in their bilateral trade.  The analysis will be made on the years 1990, 1995, 
2000 and 2005, The motivation for selecting this particular years is to capture the 
average five year trade patterns between Russia and Taiwan. Moreover, from 1990 to 
1995 it will represent the effect of Russian economic transition on trade with Taiwan. 
To calculate the trade potentials; actual trade flow values between Russia and Taiwan 
are to be expressed as a percentage of the values predicted by the models mentioned 
above.  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 =    !"#$%&'(%)*!"#$%&'#$(")$ ∗ 100 (5) 
 
Thus, the outcome will have three possibilities; first, when the percentage is 
close to 100 percent the trade will be considered to be at its full potential. In this case, 
it will indicate the normality of trade patterns between Russia and Taiwan. Second, 
when the percentage is below 100 percent; this will indicate the untapped trade 
potential between the two countries, and the case of foreseen opportunities for Taiwan 
to imply policies that would allow expand its trade markets with Russia for a more 
beneficial trade. Third, the case where actual trade flows outperform predicted trade 
values; thus, it would be the case of having both countries trading above their 
estimated potential; hence, the possibility of trade expansions will be low, and the 
further efforts conducted to expand trade markets will be considered as politically 
motivated.  
 
3.2.2. The Data 
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variables for equation (3) is export from a 
country to its partner, and for equation (4) it’s the bilateral trade between the two 
countries, which is accounted as imports plus exports. Therefore, the aim of the 
dataset is to gather the maximum amount of trade recorded within a pair of countries 
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for a given year. However, each year of the four selected years, does not contain the 
same amount of observations, as the countries of which trade recorded are different 
from a given year to another.   
The dataset used is the one provided by Head,	  Mayer	  and	  Ries (2010), which 
is available on the CEPII databases1. (2013). Originally, the data obtained dated from 
1948 to 2006; nevertheless, years concerning the current study were filtered out from 
it. In the dataset, bilateral trade was obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). In the yearbook of DOTS, two distinct values 
are registered for country A’s exports to B and country B’s import from A. In this 
case, Head,	  Mayer	   and	  Ries (2010), recorded in the dataset country B’s import as 
export flow from country A to B. The rational behind it is that imports are more 
carefully registered since they are subject to governmental monitoring for custom 
duties. For the equation (4), to obtain the total bilateral trade flow; data for trade from 
equation (3) is summed up and duplicates are deleted.   
GDP is obtained from World Bank‘s World Development Indicator (WDI). 
However, since Taiwan is not part of WDI’s database, the authors obtained its 
indicators from Taiwanese national data sources. Moreover, data regarding GDP for 
several countries is lacking in CEPII dataset, since it is not given by WDI; therefore, 
the gaps were filled from UN’s National Accounts Main Aggregate Databases (SNA, 
2013). To compile the RTA table, Head,	  Mayer	   and	  Ries (2010), referred to Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007), and utilized WTO website for additional information 
regarding the RTAs and constructing the GATT \ WTO dataset. Furthermore, reports 
regarding bilateral distance along with common official language were obtained from 
the CEPII geographical databases. 
 As the theory suggests, GDP should be positively correlated with imports and 
exports; to check the validity of the following theory, it is useful to plot Taiwan’s trade 
as a function of GDP of its partner’s country. To have a pole of homogenous partners 
and disregard the factor of distance, the scatter plot includes the countries of the 
European Union (EU)2 . Distance within the EU countries is sufficiently small 
compared to the distance separating them from Taiwan. Moreover, EU is a costume 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8	  	  2 	  Head	   and	   Mayer	   2013,	   applied	   the	   same	   analytical	   methodology	   with	   Japan;	   given	   the	  geographical	  location	  of	  Taiwan,	  Japan’s	  analysis	  could	  be	  applied	  on	  Taiwan.	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union; therefore, countries in the Union usually apply a similar trade policy against a 
particular country. (Head & Mayer 2013). In addition, Taiwan does not share colonial 
history, border, religion or any other cultural aspect with a certain country in Europe. 
Values are indexed by having them divided with the corresponding values of Greece, 
given it’s a middle-sized economy. 
 
Figure	  5	  :	  Taiwan's	  bilateral	  exports	  and	  the	  partners	  GDP	  
	  Source:	  IMF	  Direction	  of	  Trade	  Statistics	  	  
Figure	  6:	  Taiwan's	  bilateral	  imports,	  and	  the	  partners	  GDP	  
 Source:	  IMF	  Direction	  of	  Trade	  Statistics.	  	  
0.0001	  
0.001	  
0.01	  
0.1	  
1	  
10	  
0.01	   0.1	   1	   10	   100	  
	  T
ai
w
an
's
	  	  E
xp
or
ts
	  G
re
ec
e=
1	  
GDP	  Greece=1	  
0.001	  
0.01	  
0.1	  
1	  
10	  
100	  
0.01	   0.1	   1	   10	   100	  
Ta
iw
an
's
	  Im
po
rt
s	  
Gr
ee
ce
=1
	  
GDP	  Greece=1	  
Awedis	  Achjian	  
30	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
As Figure (5), and Figure (6) suggests while GDP of the corresponding country is 
increasing; its trade with Taiwan is also increasing. Therefore, Taiwan’s data fits the 
earlier mentioned theory regarding the gravity model.  
 
3.2.3. Econometric Issues 
First while running the models, results came out with high degrees of 
heteroskedasticity; thus, not having homogeneity of variance. An effective way 
suggested by Sepherd (2012) to cure the problem of heteroskedasticity is to use robust 
standard errors. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the variables and the coefficient of 
determination (R2 ) of the model remains the same; hence it should not make any 
difference while estimating our potential trade values. Besides, the dataset contained 
some observations that had zero as the value for trade flow. It is not possible to 
determine whether trade is non existent or too small to be reported. Batra (2004) 
claims that these observations usually present a problem for estimating the gravity 
model in its log form. Therefore, such observations were dismissed from the dataset. 
Moreover, other registered trade values in the dataset were too small; hence they were 
considered as outliers. For that reason, the models are flagged, and every observation 
that is recorded with a trade flow value less than $100 000 was omitted from the 
dataset of equation (3), and the values smaller than $200 000 from equation (4). With 
the dismissal of the mentioned observations, the models produced a greater fit; thus it 
was considered to have a better predictive capability. 
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4. Estimation Results and Analysis 
4.1. Regression Outputs 
Table	  2:	  Output	  for	  the	  gravity	  model	  (3)	  
  1990 1995 2000 2005 
 VARIABLES LnTradeij LnTradeij LnTradeij LnTradeij 
     LnGDPi 0.794*** 0.832*** 0.841*** 0.899*** 
     LnGDPj 0.718*** 0.732*** 0.739*** 0.749*** 
     LnWDISTij -0.883*** -0.859*** -0.846*** -0.883*** 
     Contiguityij 0.358*** 0.895*** 0.899*** 1.028*** 
     Languageij 0.703*** 0.770*** 0.630*** 0.758*** 
     GATT\WTOij 0.213*** 0.268*** 0.180** 0.310** 
     GATT\WTO i\j 0.0175 -0.186*** -0.0386 -0.165*** 
     RTAij 0.735*** 0.805*** 0.976*** 0.656*** 
     Constant 7.851*** 6.897*** 6.531*** 5.808*** 
     Observations 11622 15001 16445 17044 
R-squared 0.613 0.635 0.635 0.64 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
For all different years, the coefficients of GDP, distance, contiguity, language 
and RTA are significant and they bear the expected signs. For the GATT \ WTO 
membership, when neither of the countries is a member, the trade between them is 
significantly higher than trade between two member countries.  However, coefficients 
for the variable that represents just one country as a member are not consistent over 
the four given years. In 1990, the result indicates that having one country of the pair 
as a member will yield higher trade than having both countries in GATT \ WTO. 
Nonetheless, the value of the coefficient is too small and insignificant. In 2000, 
similarly the coefficient is insignificant, except the sign is negative. In 1995 and 2005 
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results indicate that if a single country of the pair is a member, trade flows are 
significantly lower from having both countries as a member. Thus the conflicting 
findings of Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Rose (2004) are reflecting in the results. 
 
Table	  3:	  Output	  for	  the	  gravity	  model	  (4)	  
  1990 1995 2000 2005 
 VARIABLES LnTradeij LnTradeij LnTradeij LnTradeij 
     Ln(GDPi*GDPj) 0.769*** 0.796*** 0.805*** 0.839*** 
     LnWDISTij -0.920*** -0.904*** -0.869*** -0.907*** 
     Contiguityij 0.391*** 0.873*** 0.883*** 1.018*** 
     Languageij 0.728*** 0.781*** 0.706*** 0.793*** 
     GATT\WTOij 0.169* 0.222*** 0.147 0.352** 
     GATT\WTO i\j 0.0527 -0.149*** -0.0447 -0.142*** 
     RTAij 0.644*** 0.732*** 0.943*** 0.633*** 
     Constant 8.677*** 7.797*** 7.239*** 6.553*** 
     
Observations 6,569 8,371 9,211 9,759 
R-squared 0.661 0.682 0.691 0.691 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As earlier mentioned, the current regression is designed to model two way 
trade between the pair of countries and is flagged for observations with trade flows 
less than $200 000. Similar to equation (3), the coefficients of GDP, Distance, 
contiguity, language and RTA are significant and the signs of coefficients is as 
anticipated. As for GATT \ WTO membership, results are consistent with equation 
(3), thus having none of the countries as a member is yielding higher trade levels. A 
possible explanation that can be incorporated with this phenomenon is the regional 
bias. For instance, in the region of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are not member countries, with the assumption of 
adjacency they are expected to have higher bilateral trade flows. On the other hand, 
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having one country as a member has a negative  coefficient over the years 1995, 2000 
and 2005. However, the coefficients are statistically significant just for 1995 and 
2005. As far as our analysis is concerned, until 2005 neither of Russia or Taiwan was 
a member of WTO; however, in 2005 Taiwan was considered to be a member. For 
equation (3) the insignificant coefficients are disregarded in calculation of potential 
trade values since none of their variables is associated with Russia’s and Taiwan’s 
characteristics. In equation (4), it is just the year 2000 where the coefficient is 
insignificant and will be included in our analysis. 
 
4.2. Trade Potential Analysis 
Table	  4:	  Trade	  potentials	  calculated	  from	  model	  (3)	  
Countryi	  
	  
Countryj	   Actual	  Trade	  
Predicted	  
Trade	  
Potential	  of	  
Expansion	  
	  	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
TWN	   1990	   RUS	   59.02827	   234.00	   25.23%*	  RUS	   TWN	   60.58549	   255.00	   23.76%*	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	  TWN	   1995	   RUS	   174.0303	   279.00	   62.38%*	  RUS	   TWN	   1627.959	   289.00	   563.31%	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	  TWN	   2000	   RUS	   186.0743	   203.00	   91.66%*	  RUS	   TWN	   1379.611	   199.00	   693.27%	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	  TWN	   2005	   RUS	   516.46	   290.00	   178.09%	  RUS	   TWN	   2196.4	   326.00	   673.74%	  
 
Table	  5:	  Trade	  potential	  calculated	  from	  model	  (4)	  
Countryij	  	   	  	  
Actual	  
Trade	   Predicted	  	  	  	  	  Trade	  
Potential	  of	  
Expansion	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  
	  
	   	   	  RUS	  TWN	   1990	   119.61376	   531.00	   22.53%*	  
	   	   	   	   	  RUS	  TWN	   1995	   1801.9893	   635.00	   283.78%	  
	   	   	   	   	  RUS	  TWN	   2000	   1565.6853	   476.00	   328.93%	  
	   	   	   	   	  RUS	  TWN	   2005	   2712.86	   779.00	   348.25%	  
* Indicates the untapped potential of trade between Russia and Taiwan. 
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Year 1990: The massive potential for expansion 
It was in early 1988, when a private business group entitled as Taiwan Provincial 
Union of Export-Import Chambers of Commerce first initiated a move to liberalize 
trade with the Soviet Union. Members of the group advertised the attractiveness of the 
Soviet-Union as a potential export market for Taiwan. In May 1988, KMT authorities 
lifted the trade ban, and allowed business delegations to travel to the Soviet-Union. 
As academics, business entities and legislators intensified the demand for bilateral 
interaction; the authorities in Taipei favored the economic interactions on the basis of 
having it separated from all other official operations, as both countries were still on 
contradicting premises in terms of politics and ideology.  It was until March 1990, 
when the government officially allowed trade and other mutual investment ties with 
the USSR.(Bahzanov, 1996).  By that time, imports from Russia accounted for 0.11 
percent of Taiwan’s total imports, and exports to Russia were 0.10 percent of total 
Taiwan’s exports. With no agencies in both countries, business entities lacked 
information and databases regarding each other’s markets. Beside, language barrier 
was obstructing the commerce, by initiating negotiation and communication 
problems. (Underwood, 1992).  
As predicted by model (3), the actual export of Taiwan to Russia was 25,23 
percent of the potential value, and imports was 23,75 percent. As for the two-way 
trade, the model (4) predicts that actual trade is 22.53 percent of the potential. 
Assuming all the component of the gravity model, mainly GDP of both countries and 
their geographic location, there was a vast room of improvement. Thus, their market 
size is an indicative for a bigger amount of commerce than the actual. The fact that 
KMT allowed for Taiwanese organizations to officially trade on that year, along with 
all the lacking facilities for a trade partnership, it is expected for both countries to 
share an untapped trade potential. Hence, Taiwan’s shift for a trade partnership with 
Russia could have yielded beneficial results, as reciprocal trade can supply both 
countries’ import demands.  
 
1995: Significant rise in Russian imports 
With all the attempts to close in on the intact trade potential, Taiwanese efforts 
produced significant result, as many upgrades were made from 1990 till 1995. In 
1991, along with the establishment of CETRA, the largest trade deal was signed 
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between the two countries. (Hu, 2007). In 1993, CETRA was already promoting 
Taiwanese trade in Russia by sponsoring trade missions and events; in parallel, 
conducting market surveys to improve the database for the Taiwanese exporters.  
During that year, 51 percent of CETRA’s total budget was devoted to trade 
promotional activities. (Underwood, 1992). With all the efforts conducted within 
diplomatic and economic ties; bilateral trade improved significantly, as from 1989 till 
1995 imports from Russia grew tremendously with an average annual growth of 86 
percent, and export by 35 percent. Thus, imports from Russia constituted 1.7 percent 
of Taiwanese total imports, and 0.22 percent of total exports. 
However, in that year, the balance of trade between the two countries was 
$1453.92 millions deficit to Taiwan. And as it is obvious, imports increased by a 
greater proportion than export. Explanations regarding this deficit suggest that while 
Russia established Taiwan as major destination for its raw material, Taiwan relatively 
failed to export its consumer goods to Russia. First, Taiwanese products were 
regarded as being expensive, and thus were faced by fierce competition from PRC’s 
cheap products. Second, luxury product consumers in Russia favored branded goods 
imported from the West. Moreover, Taiwanese business executives had to deal with 
the escalating inflation in Russia, its lack of foreign currency, obscure legal system 
and widespread political instability. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 103). Therefore, results 
indicated that Taiwan is exporting 62,38 percent of the expected value to Russia, and 
importing 6 times higher than the potential. By this time the predicted two-way trade 
already surpassed its potential, as the actual value is 2,39 times bigger than predicted. 
 
2000: Taiwan struggling to export to its full potential  
From 1995 to 2000, major developments regarding the economic upgrade 
between Russia and Taiwan were mainly highlighted by the agreement on air 
communication in 1997, and the protocol that was signed in 1998 for sea transport. 
Moreover, a representative office of Moscow in Taipei was established. (Vradiy). On 
the other hand, politically, Taiwan attempted to sign an arm deal with Russia in 1998; 
nevertheless, President Yeltsin totally denied the proposal and reassured China that 
such deal would never occur. Furthermore, in 2000, the new president of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Putin favored improving its relations with China, and 
disregarding any improvements for diplomatic relation with Taiwan. (Tubilewicz, 
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2007, p. 109).  Therefore, from 1995 till 2000 the overall trade climate didn’t improve 
as much as it did in the previous lustrum. Consequently, from 1994 till 2000, exports 
from Taiwan to Russia had an average annual decrease of 2.11 percent and imports 
remained almost stagnant with a slight average annual decrease of 0.65 percent. 
 In terms of Taiwanese export to Russia, comparing the year 2000 to 1995; the 
difference between them indicates that in 2000 exports were higher by just $12 
millions. And yet the untapped trade potential had significantly decreased as Taiwan 
exported to Russia by 91.66 percent of its potential. With regards to Taiwanese import 
from Russia, in year 2000 the imports were lower by $248.348 million compered to 
1995. Still, the actual trade surpassed the potential with a bigger proportion than it did 
in 1995, as Taiwan was importing almost 7 times higher than the potential. Assuming 
that the ratio of trade to its potential have genuinely increased would be totally 
fallacious, if we don’t take into account the Russian economic crisis of 1998 when its 
GDP shrank by 5.3 percent. In year 1995, GDP of Russia was $395528 million and it 
decreased to $259708 million in 20003 . Therefore, while simulating the trade 
potential, plotting a smaller value as Russia’s GDP would yield a smaller predicted 
trade value. Hence, this will result into an improper analysis by creating discrepancies 
in equation (5), where the denominator would be deflated. Consequently, analyzing 
the year 2000 would not yield reliable results, since it is considered as a crisis year for 
Russia.  
 
2005: Trade beyond potential and Taiwan in WTO 
From 2000 till 2005 many factors influencing bilateral trade has changed. 
Russia had entered its stability period with increasing economic growth rates, and 
Taiwan, although was not a major victim of the Asian Financial crisis had already 
recovered. Therefore, the discrepancies of the previous lustrum are dropped; 
accordingly, results will yield a lucid image of trade dynamics between the two 
countries. In 2002, Taiwan Russia Association (TRA) was established in Taipei, its 
function was to further promote economic, cultural and scientific cooperation. TRA 
officials had many business promotion tours across Moscow and St. Petersburg, and 
signed many deals, including oil purchase agreements. Furthermore, by that time, 
Taiwan already became a member of WTO, and negotiations between the two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  data	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  dataset	  earlier	  mentioned	  in	  paragraph	  3.2.2	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countries took place for a prospective Russian accession to WTO. Hence, this would 
increase economic collaboration and more importantly would lower tariffs on 
Taiwanese exports. (Tubilewicz 2007, p. 120).  
Thereupon, the average annual increase gained back its momentum, as 
Taiwanese imports from Russia increased by 14.49 percent and exports by 26.3 
percent. As far as the analysis of trade potentials, Taiwan finally covered its untapped 
potential and lifted its exports significantly, as they accounted for 178.09 percent of 
the predicted trade value. On the other hand, Russian imports to Taiwan were still 6 
times greater than the potential. As for the prediction made by the equation (4), 
bilateral trade between the two countries reasonably remained above potential.  
 
4.3. The ongoing trade missions: Taiwanese Trade Motives  
 As it is argued, Taiwan employs its trade facilities as a platform to interact 
with various political entities, in order to expel the Beijing imposed international 
isolation. (Sigrid 2008, Tubilewicz 2002). Therefore, the suggested method was to 
quantitatively identify Taiwanese trade policies by calculating trade potentials for 
exhibiting trade patterns in accordance to the political events. Until, the end of the 
first millennium, trade with Russia could have been for both political and economic 
purposes since there was a huge margin of trade potential that can be covered. Thus, it 
could have been a way to get in touch with the Russian authorities, and diminish the 
high trade dependence with the United States and Japan.  It took until 2005 for 
Taiwan to fully exhaust its export potential. Since then, every attempt for trade 
promotion would have diminishing returns. Nevertheless, after 2005, Taiwan never 
ceased to promote its bilateral trade with Russia and kept on establishing economic 
corporations across the Russian federation. In October 2011, the fourth “Taiwan-
Russia Economic Cooperation Meeting” sponsored by TRA and other agencies took 
place in Moscow with a delegation of 43 members from Taiwan4. In December 2011, 
Taiwanese Minister of Economic affairs expressed Taiwan’s desire to expand its trade 
markets with Russia, as Russia will have more transparency after joining WTO. 
(Tapei Times, 2011). Later in the same year, during the 2012 ministerial meeting of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  information	  is	  taken	  of	  Taiwanese	  Bureau	  of	  Trade	  :	  http://www.trade.gov.tw/English/Pages/detail.aspx?nodeID=86&pid=330744	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the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Vladivostok, the Taiwanese 
Economic Minister expressed his desire to further establish oil and petroleum trade 
links with Russia. The Minister Shih Yen-shiang also expressed Taiwan’s aspiration 
for engaging in scientific expertise such as aerospace technology and nanotech. 
(China Times, 2012). During the same month The Taiwan External Trade 
Development Council (TIETRA) opened a new branch in St. Petersburg, with the aim 
of promoting Taiwanese export markets in Russia5. In May 2013, the yearly trade 
mission was sent to Russia; the agenda included five different meetings in Kyiv, 
Bucharest, Vilnius, Moscow and Vladivostok. Similarly other series of trade missions 
took place in the last five years sponsored by TIETRA and other agencies in Russia. 
Considering that by 2005, Taiwan had already reached its export potential with 
Russia, the sequel of trade missions and the establishments of trade agencies are 
deemed to be symbolic, and indicative for a mean to awaken Taiwanese presence in 
Russia. Moreover, trade agencies can serve as a gateway for Taiwanese officials to 
get engaged with Russian authorities; when first TRA was established, in July 2002, 
Chang Chun-hsiung, Secretary-General of DPP party was the first president. Besides, 
during the founding ceremony Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (also member of 
DPP) was present along with many other Russian officials. (Tubilewicz, 2007, p. 
115). Therefore, while engaging in trade activities Taiwan is betting on its political 
and the institutional rapprochement, rather than it’s economic and market outcomes. 
 It is also striking the timing by which imports from Russia reached their 
potential, since they were already surpassing it by 5 folds in 1995. This can reveal 
some hints regarding Taiwanese trade policy. In 1992, when the trade missions were 
still in their early stages, Taiwanese business lobby claimed the possibility of 
importing raw material for infrastructural construction. (Underwood, 1993). Public 
Construction Commission responsible for the infrastructural construction in Taiwan is 
publically owned. Therefore, the government owned entity directly boosted the launch 
of the trade alliance with Russia, by signing a long-term contract for purchasing steel 
products. (Bazhanov, 1996). Moreover, the trend remained the same as in 2004, 
according to Tubilewicz (2007 p. 105), the import of metals and other sorts of raw 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  information	  is	  taken	  from	  TIETRA	  website:	  http://www.taiwantrade.com.tw/MAIN/en_front/searchserv.do?method=listNewsDetail&information_id=46401&tableType=I&locale=2&searchState=newsSearch&fromIndex=y#	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materials constituted 80 percent of Taiwan’s total imports from Russia. As earlier 
mentioned in 2012, Taiwan’s desire to import oil from Russia can also be considered 
as politically motivated. The Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC), is a state owned 
firm in Taiwan, that controls every feature of the energy industry, and it functions 
under the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ supervision. (Ball et al. 2006). Therefore, the 
government can direct its oil import policy and choose the partners in accordance to 
its political motives. 
 If Taiwan is opting for a political rapprochement through an economic tie, it 
requires radical changes in the structure of their economic interaction and diversifying 
economic ties beyond trade.  Reciprocal FDI would be an alternative as it provides a 
solid liaison between the two countries; besides, it would help increase the influence 
of Taiwanese lobby in Russia. To do so, Taiwan should opt for agreements that would 
promote protection of investments, and reduce double taxation. According to Vradiy 
(2007), This would provide Taiwanese investors the same conditions that are applied 
to Chinese and other South East Asian investors. Therefore, the increase in FDI would 
be possible by the efforts of Russian government in facilitating the flows from 
Taiwan. Thus, the needed investment climate would not be realized without a clear 
Russian governmental policy regarding Taiwan. Note that in 2004 Taiwanese FDI in 
Russia was $3 million, the number is considered to be negligible when compared to 
$980 million of Chinese FDI in Russia (Tubilewicz, 2007 p. 103). 
 
4.4. Limitations of the analysis 
The analysis conducted has few limitations, and they are stated as follows. 
First, for each year of analysis, numbers of observations were different, as the year 
1990 has the least amount. Therefore, for the robustness of the model, it would have 
been much more effective to have higher amounts of observations; thus, more trades 
recorded. Furthermore, for a cross section gravity model, results yield inconsistent 
coefficients over different years (B. Lissovolik & Y. Lissovolik 2004), and thus it was 
the case for GATT \ WTO estimates, as the sign of the coefficients swapped from a 
year to another. More importantly, Russia’s import from China is significantly high, 
and many Chinese products are produced and exported to Russia by Taiwanese owned 
enterprises. Thus, this trade is officially recorded as part of Sino-Russian trade; hence 
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they are disregarded from our model. Besides, by using the gravity model we are 
dismissing intra-industry and intra-firm trade that is mainly consisted of parts and 
components ( Xu & Yu 2009); given that exports from Taiwan were consisted of ICT 
and other technological products which can be used as intermediate goods for heavy 
machinery in Russia; there might be an undervaluation of Taiwanese exports. For 
future research, it would be beneficial to design a compelling model that entails a 
clearer image of Russian Taiwanese trade, with a panel data regression that takes into 
account time and price factors. In addition, decomposing exports into product groups 
to separately analyze raw material and ICT sector trade would make it possible to 
assess sectoral trade potentials between the two countries 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
By the end of the cold war, Taiwan launched a mission to improve its ties with 
the former Soviet Union. By the time when Russia was struggling with its transition 
hardships, Taiwan capitalized on its economic superiority and approached with trade 
promoting strategies. Over the decade, with the governmental efforts in boosting trade 
by purchasing raw materials from Russia, along with the great efforts conveyed by 
various agencies; Taiwan succeeded in increasing bilateral trade with Russia, and 
even exceeding its potential.  In the literature discussing Taiwanese trade policies, 
many authors pointed out to the complementarity of Taiwanese trade policy and its 
political interest. Therefore the project’s aim was to validate this assumption, through 
the use of quantitative analysis. To achieve this task, a gravity model was designed, 
and results were analyzed in their political and economic context. The findings 
revealed a defectiveness of bilateral trade in 1990; further in 1995, a boom in 
Taiwanese imports from Russia that outperformed its potential within five years. 
Furthermore, results proclaimed the Taiwanese struggle in establishing Russia as a 
steady export destination since it took around 15 years for Taiwan to export above the 
potential. Thereafter, the growing number of export missions along with the state-
owned petroleum corporation’s shift to Russian oil supply, were considered as having 
a slight economic motive, rather they were deemed to be politically motivated and 
exploited as a tool to promote Taiwanese awareness in Russia. 
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Suggested economic means that would generate a greater political 
rapprochement would be achieved by imposing fundamental changes within Russian 
economic conditions as recipient to Taiwanese FDI. These types of changes can be 
made through government interactions, and it requires the formulation of ambiguous 
trade policy from the Russian authorities in regards to Taiwan. Vradiy (2007) claims 
that with the absence of governmental cooperation economic relations would not 
further develop. However, in order to get engaged in governmental diplomacy, 
Taiwan has to gain the consideration of the Russian officials. Hence, this study 
suggested that Taiwan is formulating its policies oppositely; thus, using economic ties 
as a portal for diplomatic relations. Given the circumstances, both countries are 
manipulating their strengths in order to fulfill their defects. In this manner, the major 
question remains, whether Taiwanese acquisition of Russian raw material, or its other 
trade unions are attractive enough for Russia to jeopardizes its relations with China. 
Geostrategic and other international interests are binding China to Russia evermore; 
therefore, risking this political partnership, requires more than just economic 
coalition, rather a radical shift in Russia’s presidential sequel, foreign policy and 
international allies. 
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